Winner of the 2021 Rear Admiral
Horace B. Robertson Prize for
International Law
Islamist Terrorism and the
Classical Islamic Law of War
Joseph Hoelz

97 INT’L L. STUD. 1633 (2021)

Volume 97

2021

Published by the Stockton Center for International Law
ISSN 2375-2831

Islamist Terrorism and the Classical Islamic Law of War

Vol. 97

Islamist Terrorism and the
Classical Islamic Law of War
Joseph Hoelz∗
CONTENTS
I.
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1634
II. Sources of Islamic Law ........................................................................ 1635
III. The Lesser Jihad and Shari’a Jus ad Bellum–Authorizing a
Just War .................................................................................................. 1640
A. Jihad and its Justification........................................................... 1640
B. The Call to Jihad ......................................................................... 1646
IV. Shari’a Jus in Bello–the Conduct of Hostilities ................................ 1648
A. Killing of Noncombatants ........................................................ 1648
B. Suicide Attacks............................................................................ 1649
C. Treatment of Prisoners of War ................................................ 1650
D. Cessation of Hostilities .............................................................. 1651
V. Islamist Terrorists ................................................................................. 1653
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1657

∗ Captain, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy. Fleet Judge Advocate, U.S.
Fleet Forces Command; former Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General, National Security Law; Chief of Operational Law, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; Officer-in-Charge, Justice
Center in Parwan, Afghanistan.
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval War College.
1633

International Law Studies

2021

I.

INTRODUCTION

I

slam is more than a religion; it is also an expansive legal system. 1 Islamic
law, or Shari’a, governs every part of Muslim society including contracts,
criminal law, transactional law, family law, and international law. In the
words of the scholar Joseph Schacht, “Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic
thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core
and kernel of Islam itself.” 2 Although there is no nation that currently uses
the Shari’a as its State legal system, most Muslim nations require that their
systems conform to the Shari’a. 3 But Islamic law is important for another
reason; it is at the heart of the Islamist 4 terrorist movement. In fact, the main
unifying principle among the various Islamist terrorist groups is their desire
to return to a religiously ordered State based upon their interpretation of the
Shari’a.
The association between Islam and terrorism has been at the forefront
of our national debate for more than twenty years. Many misunderstandings
exist about what Islam, and specifically Shari’a law, teaches about terrorist
acts and the waging of war. Unfortunately, there is no perfectly defined delineation between Islamist terrorist ideology and mainstream Islamic ideology. The goal of this article is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of Shari’a law, describe Islam’s teachings on key principles of the law of
war, and show how the interpretation of Shari’a law relied upon by Islamist
terrorists generally contradicts that of mainstream Islamic scholars.
The article begins with a review of the primary and secondary sources of
Islamic law and the attendant controversies. It then defines jihad, explores
the Islamic law on authorizing a just war, and highlights how terrorist groups
selectively interpret the primary sources to justify their ideology. Next, it explains the divergent views on the law concerning treatment of noncombatants, suicide attacks, treatment of prisoners, and cessation of hostilities. The

1. Sobhi Mahmassani, The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine, 117
RECUEIL DES COURS 205, 210 (1966).
2. JOSEPH SCHACT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).
3. See NINA SHEA, RADICAL ISLAM’S RULES 194–203 (Paul Marshall ed., 2005) for a
discussion on how many Muslim countries still rely heavily on Shari’a. Additionally, many
Muslim States still use substantive portions of Shari’a in their State legal systems, a common
example being Islamic family law.
4. Islamism is an Islamic revivalist movement, often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life.
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final section further defines the background, principles, and goals of Islamist
terrorist organizations, using al-Qaeda and associated Islamist terrorist
groups as an example. It concludes by summarizing the divergent interpretations of Shari’a and makes modest suggestions on steps that can be taken
to alleviate the influence of these terrorist groups.
II.

SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW

Islamic law, or Shari’a, refers to the total sum of Islamic legal guidance. The
two primary sources, in order of precedence, are the Koran and the Traditions
of the Prophet, which are Muhammad’s teachings, deeds, and approved
practices. 5 The two most important complementary sources of law are consensus of opinion and analogy. 6 A familiarization with these sources and the
associated controversies is necessary to understand the conflicting theologies
of mainstream Islamic jurists and Islamist terrorists.
The most authoritative source of law in Islam is the Koran, which is
viewed by Muslims as the very word of God as revealed to his Prophet, Muhammad. 7 Muhammad was born in Mecca in AD 570. 8 After a short career
as a trader, he committed himself to intense worship and meditation. 9 It was
during this period that Muhammad began receiving divine revelations. The
revelations occurred intermittently over the course of twenty-two years,
starting in AD 610 and continuing until his death in AD 632. 10 The Koran
consists of 114 chapters, and contains 6,666 verses. 11 Of those verses, approximately seventy deal directly with the conduct of hostilities. 12 The Koranic revelations were normally committed to writing by Muhammad’s followers, but were not originally organized in one comprehensive document. 13
5. S. Sherif Hassan, Unpublished Materials for the Use of Students in the Seminar in
Islamic Law and Middle Eastern Legal Institutions 117, Columbia University School of Law,
(2010) (on file with author).
6. See id.
7. Shaheen Sardar Ali & Javaid Rehman, The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,
10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 1, 3 (2005).
8. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 12 (1999).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Ali & Rehman, supra, note 7, at 3.
12. Id.
13. See Mohamed Abdel Dayem & Fatima Ayub, In the Path of Allah: Evolving Interpretations of Jihad and its Modern Challenges, 7 UCLA JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC & NEAR EASTERN LAW
67, 75 (2009); Hassan, supra note 5, at 128.
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The process of consolidating the revelations began after Muhammad’s
death. 14 The current version of the Koran was finally compiled, organized,
and disseminated in AD 650. 15 Rather than a chronological arrangement, the
Koran is, for the most part, organized by the length of its chapters. 16 The
Koran and the Traditions were originally written in classical Arabic and have
multiple translations that can lead to very different interpretations. 17 Often,
Islamist terrorists rely upon the less well accepted interpretations to support
their radical agendas. 18
It is important to understand the political context in which the Koran was
revealed. The first revelations came during Muhammad’s twelve and a half
years in Mecca. 19 He and his followers lived under the authority of the Meccan government and were subject to persecution. 20 Many of the revelations
during that period are characterized by the need and desire for peaceful interaction with non-Muslims and the expansion of the faith through reasoned
discourse. 21 After the Harij, Muhammad’s migration to Medina, the early
Muslims’ political fortunes began to change. Muhammad accumulated many
followers and became the political ruler of Medina. 22 Persecution of the Muslims by the Meccans continued, but the Muslims’ ability to defend themselves had vastly improved. It is during this period when most of the verses
relating to hostilities were revealed. 23 These verses governed how the Muslims should defend themselves and their faith. It is generally agreed that the
Meccan revelations, along with the Traditions from that period, were primarily religious and moral axioms. 24 Comparatively, the verses revealed after
the Harij (migration) are, to a great extent, political and legal in substance
14. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 74.
15. Hassan, supra note 5, at 128.
16. Id. at 129.
17. See YOUSSEF H. ABOUL-ENEIN & SHERIFA ZUHUR, ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE 9 (2004).
18. See id.
19. Hassan, supra note 5, at 127.
20. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 12.
21. It was during this period that Koranic Verse 16:125 was revealed: “CALL THOU
[all mankind] unto thy Sustainer’s path with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with
them in the most kind manner: for, behold, thy Sustainer knows best as to who strays from
His path, and best know He as to who are the right-guided.” This verse shows the emphasis
placed on promulgation of the faith through peaceful reason.
22. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 12.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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and address the specific political situations that presented themselves at the
time. 25
As the Muslims’ political and societal needs developed, the law required
further refinement. Additional Koranic verses were revealed to Muhammad
through the angel Gabriel to meet these requirements. 26 Some of the newer
verses dealt with themes addressed in older verses, but in a way that reflected
the changed circumstances. 27 This linear revelation addressing changing circumstances created what some commentators see as contradictions in the
Koran. The prime example is the claim that the verses that advocate peaceful
discourse with non-believers, revealed during the Meccan period, are contradicted by verses that are taken by some to advocate forced conversion, which
were revealed during the later Medina period. 28 These and other seeming
contradictions gave rise to the concept of abrogation, 29 a commonly accepted principle in Islamic jurisprudence and one which plays a central role
in Islamist terrorist theology and justification for jihad. 30 Islamist terrorists
rely partially on the abrogation of peaceful verses to justify their actions. As
discussed below, most mainstream Islamic jurists instead rely upon historical
context and advocate a holistic reading of the Koran. 31
The second source of Islamic law is the Traditions of the Prophet. 32
These are divided into three parts: sayings and statements of Muhammad;
the deeds and actions of Muhammad; and Muhammad’s silence or tacit approval regarding things that occurred with his knowledge. 33 While not the
actual word of God, most Muslims believe in the infallibility of the Traditions because of Muhammad’s role as the Prophet and supreme authority in
25. Id.
26. Hassan, supra note 5, at 126.
27. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 75.
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. at 75.
30. For an additional discussion on abrogation, see THE ROYAL AAL AL-BAYT INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT, JIHAD AND THE ISLAMIC LAW OF WAR, 28–31 (2009) (“Abrogation (naskh) means that the legally binding status of a Qur’anic verse is superseded by
the legally binding authority of a verse that is revealed later. For example, one verse of the
Qur’an prohibits Muslims from praying while intoxicate, while a later verse abrogates this
verse by promulgating an absolute prohibition on the consumption of alcohol.” Id. at 28–
29.).
31. DR. MUHAMMAD HAMIDULLAH, THE MUSLIM CONDUCT OF STATE 18 (7th ed.
1987).
32. Hassan, supra note 5, at 134.
33. Id.
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the interpretation of the Koran. 34 This belief is based upon the following Koranic verses: 35 “O you who have attained faith, pay heed unto God and his
Apostle”; 36 “Hence, pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the Apostle”; 37
“Whoever pays heed unto the Apostle pays heed unto God thereby”; 38
“Hence, accept [willingly] whatever the Apostle gives you [thereof], and refrain from [demanding] anything that he withholds from you.” 39
While there is little controversy among most Muslims over the authority
of the Traditions, there has been controversy over some of the Traditions’
authenticity. 40 This controversy partially derives from the fact that the Traditions were not comprehensively compiled until more than one hundred
years after Muhammad’s death. 41 Manipulation and outright forgeries of Traditions were promulgated for political or personal ends for approximately
two hundred years after that. 42 Principles from other religions and axioms
from the great philosophers were even ascribed to Muhammad. 43 A solution
for this problem was devised by the great Islamic jurist Muhammad ibn Idris
al-Shafi, who developed a system to validate the Traditions. 44 Although the
system has many detractors in western scholarship, 45 it put an end to the
manipulations and forgeries and established an empirical standard for accepting Traditions believed to be authentic. 46 There are six compilations of
these Traditions that all Sunni 47 Muslims accept as authoritative. 48
The two next most important sources of Islamic law are consensus of
opinion and analogy. 49 While the Koran and Traditions are based upon the
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. KORAN 8:20.
37. Id. 5:92.
38. Id. 4:80.
39. Id. 59:7.
40. See H.A.R. GIBB, MOHAMMEDANISM 39 (1962).
41. Hassan, supra note 5, at 135. It should also be noted that many Traditions were
recorded during Muhammad’s life.
42. See GIBB, supra note 40, at 75.
43. Id.
44. FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM 47 (1979).
45. See N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 64 (1964).
46. Id. at 70.
47. More than seventy-five percent of all Muslims worldwide identify as Sunni. Central
Intelligence Agency, Field Listings—Religion, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.
gov/the-world-factbook/field/religions/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2021).
48. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 23.
49. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 230.
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revealed word of God and guidance from his Prophet, these two sources of
law consist of opinions of influential Muslim jurists based on their own human rationality. 50 Most Muslims accept the authority of consensus and analogy, but Islamist terrorists reject them and other complementary sources as
being inauthentic expressions of the will of God. 51
The foundation for consensus of opinion is partially based on the Tradition that Muhammad said, “My people shall never be unanimous in error.” 52 The classical requirement for this source of law is universal acceptance by Muslim jurists. 53 The controversies here are apparent: 54 What is
the definition of a Muslim jurist? Does universal mean unanimous? Is one
school’s consensus binding on the others? Is one generation’s consensus
binding on the next? Should the consensus be based upon popular agreement, or agreement among religious scholars? Pragmatic Islamic jurists
forged ahead in the face of these problems and were able to convince their
most influential contemporaries to agree on many legal principles through
consensus. This led one Islamic scholar to remark that “the gap between
theory and practice of [consensus of opinion] remains a striking feature of
this doctrine.” 55 But despite the controversy and gap between theory and
practice, consensus of opinion has greatly enhanced the breadth and depth
of Islamic law. 56
The fourth source of Islamic law, analogy, was developed in response to
the expansion of the Islamic State and the requirement for more specific
guidance than what was found in the Koran, Traditions, and consensus of
opinion. 57 Analogy is the process of extending a legal rule to a new case. 58 It
requires that both cases have an identical common effective cause. 59 An example is the extension of the prohibition of wine to all intoxicating liquors,
the common effective cause being the intoxicating property. 60 Many criticize
the use of analogy for several reasons: the Koran is a sufficient source of law;
50. Id.
51. See Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 19.
52. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 23.
53. M.H. KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 168 (1991).
54. See AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 23–24.
55. KAMALI, supra note 53, at 168.
56. See AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 24.
57. SOBHI MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI FI AL-ISLAM, [THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW IN ISLAM] 234 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., 1961).
58. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 231.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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analogy is just guess work by jurists; and, it may be argued, Muhammad and
the Companions were against analogy. 61 Despite these criticisms, a majority
of Muslim jurists accept the authority of analogy as the fourth source of Islamic law.
III.

THE LESSER JIHAD AND SHARI’A JUS AD BELLUM—
AUTHORIZING A JUST WAR

A. Jihad and its Justification
It is well accepted among mainstream Islamic jurists that Islam is fundamentally a religion of peace. 62 The literal translation of the word Islam is “submission or surrender,” in the context of submitting to the will of God. 63
“The word ‘peace’ and its derivatives are cited in more than one hundred
verses of the Koran, while the word ‘war’ and its derivative verb are mentioned in only six verses.” 64 Notably, the most common greeting in the Muslim world is “assalamu alaikum,” which means “peace be upon you.” 65 A key
Koranic passage that reinforces this peaceful vision of Islam is the following:
“But if they incline to peace, incline thou to it as well, and place thy trust in
God . . . .” 66
Although the preferred method for the expansion of Islam is through
peaceful propagation, 67 Islamic law authorizes the use of force in certain circumstances, and makes it obligatory in others. When Muhammed and early
Muslims were persecuted by the Meccan Arabs, the Koranic revelations authorized jihad (jus ad bellum) to defend the faith. 68 In later revelations, as discussed below, the Koran called for aggressive jihad. Some argue this justifies
expansion of the faith by force.
The word jihad should not be exclusively read to mean war. Jihad’s literal
translation is “effort and exertion.” 69 It is used in the Koran in the wider sense
61. MAHMASSANI, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN ISLAM, supra note 57, at 81.
62. See HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 7; Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 242.
63. Hassan, supra note 5, at 121.
64. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 242.
65. Id.
66. KORAN 8:61.
67. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 279, 242.
68. Id. at 279. It is worth noting that the early jihads to defend the faith brought relative
peace to the Arabian Peninsula, served as a unifying force among the Arabs, and brought
an end to tribal feuds. Id. at 278.
69. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 145.
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of self-exertion, as well as effort and exertion in war. 70 The Koran and the
Traditions set forth two classes of jihad, the greater and the lesser. 71 The
greater jihad refers to worship and the spiritual struggle with oneself that
every Muslim must constantly engage in. 72 The greater jihad was the original
jihad and was described in the following three early Koranic verses when the
use of force was still prohibited: 73
“And those of you who make jihad in Our (cause), We will certainly
guide them to Our paths . . . .” 74
“Therefore, listen not to the unbelievers, but make jihad against them
with the utmost strenuousness, with (the Koran).” 75
“And whoever makes jihad he does so for his own soul . . . .” 76
The greater jihad directed Muslims to persevere against oppression and
to peacefully propagate Islam. 77 Conversely, the lesser jihad is the religious
obligation or command to fight a just war on behalf of Islam. 78 The lesser
jihad also encompasses more than physically going to war. It includes the
giving of property and wealth, organizing and communicating, and all other
acts in support. 79
The lesser jihad originated as a means to preserve the religion and protect
early Muslims from attacks by non-believers. 80 The first verses of the Koran
that sanctioned jihad against non-Muslims, thus providing jus ad bellum, were
revealed shortly after the Harij (migration to Medina) in AD 622. 81 The
verses main focus is on self-defense and compassion. Two of the most important of these verses about defensive jihad may be translated as follows:
And fight in God’s cause against those who wage war against you, but
do not commit aggression—for verily, God does not love aggressors. And
70. Id.
71. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 73.
72. Id.
73. LOUAY M. SAFI, PEACE AND THE LIMITS OF WAR—TRANSCENDING THE CLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF JIHAD 6 (2003).
74. KORAN 29:69.
75. Id. 25:52.
76. Id. 29:6.
77. SAFI, supra note 73.
78. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 73.
79. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 163. This is supported by Koranic verse 9:41: “Go
forth to war, whether it be easy or difficult [for you], and strive hard in your God’s cause
with your possessions and your lives . . . .”
80. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 279.
81. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 145.
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slay them wherever you may come upon them, and drive them away from
wherever they drove you away—for oppression is even worse than killing.
And fight not against them near the Inviolable House of Worship unless
they fight against you there first; but if they fight against you, slay them:
such shall be the recompense of those who deny the truth. But if they desist—behold, God is much-forgiving, a dispenser of grace. Hence, fight
against them until there is no more oppression and all worship is devoted
to God alone; but if they desist, then all hostility shall cease, save against
those who [willfully] do wrong. 82
Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being
wrongfully waged—and, verily, God has indeed the power to succor
them—those who have been driven from their homelands against all right
for no other reason than their saying, “Our Sustainer is God!” For, if God
had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, [all]
monasteries and churches and synagogues and mosques—in [all of] which
God’s name is abundantly extolled—would surely have been destroyed [ere
now]. 83

The use of force authorized by these revelations is notable in that they
do not allow aggressive jihad, but are defensive in nature. However, they did
signify a change in Islamic doctrine that began an evolution towards an increasingly aggressive Koranic authorization of jihad. 84 The first phase of this
evolution, associated with Mohammed’s time in Mecca, was non-confrontational: the use of force was prohibited. 85 That was likely necessary due to the
small number of followers and the lack of any political power. 86 The second
phase of the evolution, the start of which can be attributed to the quotes in
the preceding paragraph, was one in which defensive jihad was authorized. 87
The final stage of the evolution of jihad was what some claim authorizes the
expansion of the faith through offensive war against non-believers, including
both polytheists and Judeo-Christians. 88
It is this final stage, the promulgation of Islam through force, which is
so controversial amongst Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Two key verses
82. KORAN 2:190–193.
83. KORAN 22:39–40.
84. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 76.
85. Id.
86. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 12.
87. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 76.
88. Id.
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from Chapter 9 of the Koran, believed to be amongst the last Koranic revelations and recorded sometime around AD 631, are at the heart of the controversy. 89 These verses are often referred to as the “Sword Verses.” 90 The
first deals with the polytheists that were prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula
at the time.
And so, when the sacred months are over, 91 slay those who ascribe
divinity to aught beside God where you may come upon them, and take
them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place. Yet if they repent, and take to prayer, and render the purifying
dues, let them go their way: for, behold, God is much-forgiving, a dispenser
of grace. 92

Islamist terrorists hold that this is clear authorization for Muslims to
wage war on the polytheists and other non-Muslims. Mainstream Islamic jurists maintain that the verse must be read in conjunction with preceding
verses and others that restrict this aggression to warfare already in progress
with those who have been aggressive or breached treaty obligations. 93
The second verse deals with the “people of the book,” Christians and
Jews, whom Muslims hold in higher regard than the polytheists. 94 It may be
translated as follows:
And fight against those who—despite having been vouchsafed revelation [aforetime]—do not [truly] believe either in God or the Last Day, and
do not consider forbidden that which God and His Apostle have forbidden, and do not follow the religion of truth [which God has enjoined upon
them], till they [agree to] pay the jizya 95 with a willing hand, after having
been humbled [in war]. 96
89. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 146.
90. THE ROYAL AAL AL-BAYT INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 31.
91. Here the Koran is confirming the pre-Islamic custom that was prevalent in Arabia
that there were times when all tribal warfare had to cease.
92. KORAN 9:5.
93. THE MESSAGE OF THE QUR’AN, 255–56 (Muhammad Assad trans., 1980).
94. Muslims recognize the prophets of Judaism and Christianity and believe that all
three religions worship the same God.
95. The jizya was a tax paid by male Christians and Jews in Muslim lands who, if Muslim,
would have been eligible for combat. The tax was for support of the armed forces, which
they did not partake in. Muslims, on the other hand, were required to pay the zakat, which
was based on percentage of income and used for charity.
96. KORAN 9:29.
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In this verse we see that Christians and Jews are permitted to retain their
religion but must submit to the rule of the Muslim State and agree to pay the
jizya. Importantly though, taking the verse out of context by over-emphasizing the “fight against” language, Islamist terrorists use this as authorization
to target Christians and Jews for jihad based upon their status as non-Muslims. Mainstream jurists believe that the jihad authorized here may only be
made in the face of unprovoked aggression. 97
The real controversy in these verses is in how the reader uses them. As
mentioned above, Islamist terrorist theology relies heavily upon the concept
of abrogation. They maintain that their interpretation of these and similar
verses abrogate more than one hundred earlier verses expounding upon the
principles of tolerance and peaceful propagation of the faith. 98 The legal concept, which is familiar to those from western legal systems, is that the most
recent law is the one that controls. 99 This view of Islam, that the Koran enjoins Muslims to an offensive conflict with non-believers, does find support
with some Islamic scholars. 100 These scholars point to historical precedent
in the actions of the early Muslims, including the Companions, 101 when they
used this aggressive view of Islam to conquer Syria, Iraq, northern Africa,
southern Spain, Persia, and northern India. 102
Other historical precedent for this view is found in the practice of dividing the world into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. Based upon the “Sword
Verses,” the actions of the Companions, and the concept of the universality
of the Muslim State, 103 early Muslim jurists divided the world into these two
principal parts. 104 Dar al-Islam is the Muslim controlled region. 105 Dar alharb is everywhere else—the enemy territory with which Islam is at war. 106
97. THE MESSAGE OF THE QUR’AN, supra note 93, at 261.
98. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 146.
99. See id. at 56, where the author discusses nask (abrogation).
100. See Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 5; AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 147.
101. The Companions of the Prophet were his close associates who had the opportunity to witness much of his life. Several of them succeeded Muhammad as leader after his
death.
102. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 148.
103. “From its inception, Islamic society was conceived as universal, because it was
based on the universal bond of religion. Muhammad’s mission was directed to all humanity.”
Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 232.
104. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 251.
105. Id.
106. Id.
1644

Islamist Terrorism and the Classical Islamic Law of War

Vol. 97

Dar al-harb is converted to dar al-Islam only when the practice of Islam is
accepted and Shari’a law is enforced. 107 The aggressive view of Islam holds
that “dar al-Islam is under permanent jihad obligation until the dar al-harb is
reduced to nonexistence” through surrender or conquest. 108
Under classical Islamic law, surrender by the enemy normally meant that
the non-Muslim State converted to Islam. 109 This comes from the Tradition
of Muhammed saying “I am ordered to fight people until they say: there is
no God but Allah; and if they say it, they render immune (from me) their
lives (blood) and their property, save by way of right.” 110 The new converts
were then afforded the protection that was due all other Muslims of the conquering State. 111 Where polytheistic enemies failed to submit to Islam and
were conquered, they were subject to harassment, could have their property
taken, or could even be subject to death. 112 However, Christians and Jews
could be afforded protection and given the status of Dhimmi (non-Muslim
living in a Muslim State). 113 They were afforded the right to continue their
religious worship, but had to pay the jizyah. 114
The opposing way to view the “Sword Verses” is to understand them in
their historical, political, and Koranic context. The early Muslim State 115 was
just that, a singular political entity. It would not have contemplated a future
in which it would subdivide into the varied autonomous Muslim political
States that exist today. These verses, as revealed through the Prophet and
political ruler, simply authorized the early Muslim State to wage war on its
neighbors in order to expand the State—a political policy. The historical reality was that the expansion of Islam brought a better political situation to
many of the people who were conquered. 116 The people of the region were

107. Id. at 251–52. See Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 9, for one theory that holds that
any State that allows Muslims to worship freely may be considered dar al-Islam. Under this
definition, most of the world would qualify as dar al-Islam.
108. Safi, supra note 73, at 7.
109. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 295.
110. Id. at 296.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 36.
115. 610–700 AD.
116. Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 6.
1645
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often ruled by oppressive regimes that did not afford basic fundamental human rights that were available under Islam. 117 At that time in history, Islam
was the “broadest, freshest and cleanest political idea that had yet come into
actual activity in the world.” 118 The Muslims most likely viewed themselves
as liberators. 119
There is also evidence that the concept of abrogation as used by Islamic
terrorists and advocated by many Islamic scholars did not even exist amongst
the early Muslims. 120 Rather, it appears that the Companions of Muhammad
viewed later revelations that contradicted earlier revelations as exceptions to
the fundamental tenets of the faith. 121 One such tenet being, “There shall be
no coercion in matters of faith.” 122 This reading of the Koran, that these few
verses should not be read to abrogate the fundamental norms of the faith, is
much more consistent with the corpus juris of the Koran. 123
B. The Call to Jihad
The Koran calls war a hateful duty, 124 and yet it clearly authorizes it in certain
circumstances. As discussed above, there are two very distinct schools of
thought on whether jihad should be waged to propagate the faith. Outside
that disagreement, there is consensus upon when jihad is authorized and
when it is a duty. Conservative jurists believe jihad should be waged only
when absolutely necessary and subject to strict conditions. 125 These conservative jurists also believe jihad is permissible in the following circumstances:
“(1) punitive war to prevent rebellion and sedition; (2) purely defensive war
to repel aggression; (3) preventative war to avert any danger to the country
as a whole or to religion and religious liberty and places of worship; and (4)

117. Id. at 6. Early Islam was groundbreaking in its protection of women and minorities,
and for protecting individuals from government oppression.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 6.
120. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 58.
121. Id.
122. KORAN 2:256.
123. See Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 241–49; ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17,
at 7–12.
124. “Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that
ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad
for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not.” KORAN 2:216.
125. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 282.
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sympathetic war to ward off oppression and injustice, especially to a friendly
or allied nation, even if it be a non-Muslim.” 126
Mainstream Islamic jurists hold that the decision to declare the lesser
jihad must be made by the State, the one notable exception being defense
against foreign aggression. 127 Most constitutions in modern Islamic States
follow this doctrine and reserve the call to war for the chief executive. 128
That is supported by Shari’a law, which vests that power in the Caliph129 or
Imam 130 alone, with allowance for limited delegation. 131 Islamic terrorists justify their right to call for jihad by their perception that the rulers of modern
Muslim States are Muslim in name alone and have been corrupted by the
West. 132 They dispute the rulers’ legitimacy, claim for themselves the authority of Imam, and call for all Muslims to take up arms against the West. 133
This call for all Muslims to participate in jihad, even if it were properly
authorized, also runs contrary to Islamic law. The criteria for those eligible
to fight are generally considered to be the following: (1) a Muslim; (2) having
reached puberty, generally considered to be the age of fifteen; (3) having no
mental defect; (4) being able to exercise free will in the decision to join in
jihad; (5) a male, although there are historical examples to the contrary; (6)
having obtained their parents’ permission; and (7) being debt free or possessing waivers from creditors. 134 Clearly these criteria are not followed by
Islamist terrorists who recruit suicide bombers from amongst women, young
children, and easily influenced individuals who have not obtained their parents’ permission. 135

126. Id. at 289–90.
127. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 163.
128. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 289.
129. A caliph was the “political office used to govern urban areas of pre-Islamic Arabia
and chosen by the consensus of tribal elders. The term pre-dates Islam and simply means
‘successor.’ ” ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 34.
130. See id. at 36 (“An Imam is, in one meaning of the word, merely a prayer-leader.
For the Shi’a Muslims, Imam is appointed by God to lead the Muslims. . . . In the Muslim
rulings on war, the term imam stands for the legitimate ruler, who was then called the caliph.
For that reason, radical leaders have sometimes used the title of Imam.”).
131. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 289.
132. See Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 112; ABOUL-EINEN & ZUHUR, supra note 17,
at 24.
133. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 112, 116–17.
134. ABOUL-EINEN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 12–13.
135. Id. at 13.
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SHARI’A JUS IN BELLO—THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES

A. Killing of Noncombatants
It is of near universal consensus that the killing of noncombatants violates
Islam. 136 In one often-quoted Tradition that is cited to support this tenet,
Muhammad sees a woman who has been slain in battle and becomes angry
over her death. 137 Additionally, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after Muhammad’s
death, gave the Muslim army the following instructions prior to a campaign
in Syria: 138
Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the
battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You
must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an
aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially
those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy’s flock, save for your
food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic service, leave them alone. 139

Muhammad and Abu Bakr’s actions played a large part in the development of early Islamic humanitarian law on the protection of noncombatants. 140 There is general agreement that this group of protected people included “children, women, the very old, blind, crippled, disabled (mentally
and physically disabled) and sick.” 141
Islamist terrorists defend their violation of these rules through two arguments. The first is that many of the women and children they kill are “potential combatants and enemies of Islam.” 142 Regarding Israel, they point to
its policy of men and women serving in combat roles and the high frequency
of Israelis remaining in military reserve even after their compulsory service
obligation. 143 The second argument is that times have changed and the rules
136. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31; Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 10; ABOUL-ENEIN &
ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 21–22.
137. ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 21.
138. Id. at 22.
139. MALIK IBN ANAS, AL-MUWATTA, Book 21, Number 21.3.10.
140. See Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 10.
141. Id.; see also HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 205 (monks and hermits are also authoritative examples of protected persons).
142. ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 23.
143. Id. See also Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 10 (quoting the Islamic scholar Iman alKasani who stated, “any person capable of fighting may be killed, whether he actually fights
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have changed. They are severely outnumbered, under-resourced, and don’t
have the support of their State leaders. In order to effectively wage jihad,
they have had to adjust tactics, which led Osama bin Laden to write, “due to
the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a
suitable means of fighting must be adopted.” 144 Neither of these arguments
is supported by Islamic law or mainstream Islamic jurists.
B. Suicide Attacks
Muhammad insisted upon waging jihad in an honorable and courageous
manner. Even the pre-Islamic Arabs’ method of attack-and-retreat guerilla
warfare 145 was disfavored by the Koranic verse, “God loves those who battle
for His cause in ranks, as if they were a solid structure.” 146 This structured
type of warfare was seen by Muhammed as more courageous and efficient. 147
Any warfare that would have used a clandestine modus operandi to target
civilians would have been seen by Muhammad, one can argue, as contradicting Islam’s rules on the use of force. 148 The same may be said of any “unnecessarily cruel and torturous ways of killing.” 149 On point is Verse 2:195 of
the Koran, which prohibits actions akin to suicide attacks and addresses how
faithful Muslims can support Jihad: “And spend in the cause of God, do not
throw yourselves into destruction and do good for, verily, God loves those who do
good.” Importantly, Islam also prohibits burning enemy warriors alive 150 and
suicide. 151 It is clear that suicide bombing of innocent noncombatants violates the Shari’a.

or not, and any person unable to fight may not be killed, unless he actually participates in
the fighting physically or mentally by way of tendering advice and provocation”).
144. Osama bin Laden’s fatwa was published in arabic, Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, AL-QUDS AL-ARABI, Feb. 23, 1998, at 1.
145. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 293.
146. KORAN 61:4.
147. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 293.
148. AN-NA’IM, supra note 8, at 156.
149. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 205.
150. Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 10.
151. “O you who believe, do not consume each others’ properties illicitly—only mutually acceptable transactions are permitted. You shall not kill yourselves. GOD is Merciful
towards you.” KORAN 4:29.
1649

International Law Studies

2021

C. Treatment of Prisoners of War
Shari’a law’s treatment of prisoners of war is somewhat contradictory. 152 In
many respects the Koran and the Traditions establish rules for treating prisoners that, with important exceptions, favorably compare to modern international humanitarian law. On the other hand, Muhammad and the Companions were guilty of atrocities that provide support for how modern Islamist terrorists treat their captives. However, any analysis of Islam’s treatment of prisoners should be considered in the historical context of practices
that were prevalent in seventh century Arabia, as well as those of Athens,
Rome, and other ancient cultural centers. 153 A comparison shows that Islamic law’s treatment of prisoners was very progressive relative to those
other cultures. 154
Most scholars hold that Islamic law forbade the execution of prisoners
for acts done during belligerency unless the head of State personally authorized it. 155 Neither could belligerents be held liable for damages they inflicted
upon the lives or property of early Muslims during belligerencies. 156 One
Tradition holds that Muhammad ordered the following: “Take heed of the
recommendation to treat the prisoners fairly.” 157 In practice this meant that
prisoners of war were to be well fed, protected from the elements, provided
clothing where necessary, have their injuries attended to, be held in the same
location as their close relatives if they were also captive, be safe from torture,
and have respect paid to their rank and position. 158 Another Koranic verse
extols upon Muslims to take care of captives as you would an orphan or the
needy. 159

152. Ali & Rehman, supra note 7, at 10.
153. See, e.g., ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 18 (pre-Islamic captives could
expect to be killed); see also Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 305 (the author states that war was
the main source of slavery in Athens and Rome).
154. The Greeks during this period had two systems: one for dealing with Greeks and
one for non-Greeks. War with non-Greeks was unlimited warfare. Similarly, the Roman
Empire had no limitations on belligerency. See, e.g., Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 305.
155. See, e.g., HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 216 (stating that even the commander-inchief could not authorize execution).
156. Id. at 214.
157. 1 TARIKH AL-TABARI, HISTORY OF THE PROPHETS AND KINGS 1337–38 (1901).
158. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 214–16; Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 92.
159. “And (they) feed with food, despite its love, the needy wretch, the orphan and the
captive.” KORAN 76:8.
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Conversely, there is evidence that the early Muslims did, in some instances, murder prisoners considered to be enemies of Islam. 160 One example was during the Battle of the Ditch where a Jewish tribe was decimated
for turning against the Muslims during the battle. 161 Some scholars also view
the following Koranic verse as supportive of killing captives: “It is not for
any Prophet to have captives until he hath made slaughter in the land.” 162
However, later verses tempered this verse, 163 and on balance, the early Muslims treated their prisoners of war much better than other cultures of the
time.
D. Cessation of Hostilities
The normal state of Islam is peace, and so war was expected to come to an
end. 164 There are four ways to end war under classical Shari’a law: the enemy’s surrender; victory by force; treaty or armistice; and cessation of hostilities without any agreement on peace. 165
In early Islamic wars, the enemy’s surrender without violence normally
meant that the sovereign of the foreign State embraced Islam on behalf of
his people and control of the land was ceded to the Muslim State. 166 The
surrender was occasionally limited to acceptance of Islam, as it was not always necessary that the foreign lands be annexed. 167 Upon conversion to
Islam, the foreigners received all the rights and obligations of all other Muslim citizens. 168 This is based on the following Tradition: “I am ordered to
fight people until they say: there is no God but Allah; and if they say it, they
render immune (from me) their lives (blood) and their property save by way
of right.” 169

160. ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 18.
161. Id.
162. KORAN 8:67.
163. “So when you meet those who disbelieve, it is smiting of the necks until you have
routed them, then tighten the fetter (bond), and afterwards either benevolent release or
ransom till the war lay down its burdens.” KORAN 47:4.
164. See Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 242, 279.
165. Id. at 295.
166. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 263.
167. Id.
168. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 295.
169. See JALALUDDIN AL-SUYUTI, AL-JAMI’ AL-KABIR, No. 1630.
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Victory by force was the most common result of the early Islamic conquests. 170 The course of the war was governed by the rules for the use of
force discussed above. Polytheists who converted received the protections
of Shari’a law; those that did not were subject to loss of their lives and property. 171 Monotheists were allowed to continue the practice of their religion
subject to payment of the jizyah. 172
Hostilities also ended as a result of an armistice or treaty of peace. 173
Most often the treaty or armistice called for an end to hostilities and the
requirement that proper neighborly relations be followed. 174 If the foreign
State ended as the weaker party, the Islamic State required payment of a tribute in exchange for a pledge of safeguard. 175 Under classical Shari’a law there
could not be a treaty of perpetual alliance with non-Muslims. 176 This was
based upon the following Koranic verses: 177
O YOU who have attained to faith! Do not take the Jews and the
Christians for your allies: they are but allies of one another—and whoever
of you who allies himself with them becomes, verily, one of them: behold,
God does not guide such evildoers. . . . Behold, your only helper shall be
God, and his Apostle, and those who have attained to faith—those that are
constant in prayer, and render the purifying dues, and bow down [before
God]: for all who ally themselves with God and His Apostle and those who
have attained to faith—behold, it is they, the partisans of God, who shall
be victorious! O you who have attained faith! Do not take for your friends
such as mock at your faith and make jest of it—be they from among those
who have been vouchsafed revelation before our time, or [from among]
those who deny the truth [of revelation as such]—but remain conscious of
God, if you are [truly] believers. 178

Based upon these verses, Muslim jurists held that the maximum length for a
treaty with non-Muslims was ten years. 179

170. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 296.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 264; Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 296.
174. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 264.
175. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 297.
176. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 265.
177. Id. at 265–66.
178. KORAN 5:51, 5:55–57.
179. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 31, at 266.
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Finally, under Islam, simple cessation of hostilities was possible, but theoretically unlikely. 180 This was because jihad was not to be waged unless there
was a just and noble cause. Ending hostilities before that just and noble cause
was fulfilled ran contrary to Islam. 181 Unless it was a defensive war, it should
not have been initiated unless success was a given, as the Koran mandates
that offensive war should not be undertaken until the State is prepared to
win. 182 The following verse shows that submission was also unlikely:
O you who have attained faith! When you meet in battle those who are
bent on denying the truth, advancing in great force, do not turn your backs
on them: for whoever on that day turns his back on them—unless it be in
a battle maneuver or in an endeavor to join another troop [of believers]—
shall indeed have earned the burden of God’s condemnation, and his goal
shall be hell: and how vile a journey’s end! 183

As can be seen in this verse, there was little room for retreat or surrender,
although many Muslim jurists hold that the Muslim commander of the army
could stop fighting when military necessity required it. 184
V.

ISLAMIST TERRORISTS

Modern Islamism is based upon the teaching of Hassan al-Banna, the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood who advocated a return to the panIslamic State. 185 While there are several nuanced ideologies among Islamists,
Islamist terrorists conform to five general principles: (1) a rejection of secularism and a dedication to the establishment of Islam as a State religion and
legal system; (2) a return to the early roots of Islam, emphasizing the Koran
and the example of Muhammad and his Companions; (3) expulsion of capi-

180. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 297.
181. Id.
182. See id.; KORAN 8:60 (“You shall prepare for them all the power you can muster,
and all the equipment you can mobilize, that you may frighten the enemies of GOD, your
enemies, as well as others who are not known to you; GOD knows them. Whatever you
spend in the cause of GOD will be repaid to you generously, without the least injustice.”).
183. KORAN 8:15–16.
184. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 298.
185. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 102.
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talistic western influences and a return to a Muslim social order; (4) the supremacy of religion over the State; and (5) jihad as the means to achieve its
goals. 186
Al-Qaeda, which is Arabic for “the Base,” is the most well-known Islamist terrorist organization. It grew out of the Makta al Khidmat lil Mujahadin
(MaK) at the end of the Soviet-Afghanistan war (1979–1989). 187 The MaK
was co-founded by Osama bin Laden and his mentor, Dr. Abdullah Azzam. 188 Al-Qaeda has a large number of affiliated organizations and operates
as a network of Islamist extremists and Salafi jihadists. 189 The main uniting
bond is their adherence to Islamism and a particular fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. 190 They work towards a return to a pure Islamic State,
free of secularism, and strict adherence to their interpretation of the
Shari’a. 191 This view advocates “an Islamic Palestinian state, removal of secular Arabic leadership, removal of western influence from the Arabic/Muslim world, the destruction of the Israeli state, and most of all, the return of
the Caliphate.” 192
Al-Qaeda wants to unite the world’s one billion Muslims under a single
leader. 193 The instrument for that unification is al-Qaeda and its affiliated
organizations, and the method is jihad. 194 Bin Laden argued that the jihad in
Afghanistan against the Soviets showed the Muslim world that they could
unite to stop a common powerful enemy. 195 Al-Qaeda and other Islamist
terrorist’s current common enemies are twofold: the Muslim leaders who, in
Al-Qaeda’s view, have abandoned the people and Shari’a law; and America,

186. Id. at 102–3.
187. Richard J. Hughbank, Understanding the al-Qaeda Organization: What Every Law Enforcement and Security Professional Should Know about Terrorism, JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNATIONAL, Summer 2008, at 2.
188. Id.
189. The Salafi jihadists believe it is the duty of every true Muslim to use force to
reestablish an Islamic caliphate.
190. Id.
191. Dayem & Ayub, supra note 13, at 102–3.
192. Hughbank, supra note 187, at 2.
193. JANE CORBIN, AL-QAEDA: IN SEARCH OF THE TERROR NETWORK THAT
THREATENS THE WORLD 23 (2003).
194. Id.
195. Id.; Osama Bin Laden Declares Jihad in 1997 CNN Interview, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2011),
www.youtube.com/watch?v=orawG7vt68o (March 1997 CNN interview of Osama bin
Laden by Peter Arnett).
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who has supported these Muslim leaders and whom they believe has
wrought atrocities on Muslims. 196
One of the main issues al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations have with Middle Eastern Muslim leaders is their invitation and tolerance of western forces on the Arabian Peninsula. 197 Their objection is partially based on the Tradition that on his deathbed Muhammad said, “May
Allah fight the Jews and the Christians! They took the graves of their Prophets as places of prostration. Two (religions) shall not co-exist in the land of
the Arabs.” 198 Al-Qaeda and many Muslims believe that non-Muslim forces
should not be allowed near the Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina, much
less live on the Arabian Peninsula. 199 Another key point of contention that
al-Qaeda has with Muslim leaders is their abandonment of Islamic law in
favor of secular legal systems. 200
A primary means for al-Qaeda’s jihad in support of its fundamentalist
philosophy has historically been the use of suicide bombers. 201 It is able to
recruit young uneducated people to carry out these travesties by convincing
them that Islam requires it of them. They argue two propositions: that every
Muslim must wage jihad against the infidels and that Allah rewards martyrdom through Jihad with eternity in paradise. 202
Islamic fundamentalists espouse the belief that, in addition to the commonly accepted five pillars of Islam, 203 the lesser jihad is a sixth pillar and
mandatory for all Muslims to practice. This concept of a sixth pillar is held
by few Muslims. 204 Instead, most Muslims believe that jihad is a collective
196. CORBIN, supra note 193, at 2; Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, https://ctc.usma.
edu/harmony-program/declaration-of-jihad-against-the-americans-occupying-the-land-ofthe-two-holiest-sites-original-language-2/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) (Osama bin Laden’s
fatwa of August 23, 1996).
197. CORBIN, supra note 193, at 2.
198. IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS, AL-MUWATTA OF IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS: THE FIRST
FOUNDATION OF ISLAMIC LAW, No. 45.5.17 (Aisha Abdurrahman Bewely trans., Kegan
Paul International 1989) (795).
199. CORBIN, supra note 193, at 23.
200. Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, supra
note 196.
201. Hughbanks, supra note 187, at 4.
202. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 280.
203. Muslims believe that there are five pillars to Islam that must be practiced by all
Muslims: the belief in one God; the (five times a day) daily prayer; zakat (alms giving); fasting; and the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).
204. Mahmassani, supra note 1, at 281.
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duty and not incumbent on Muslims individually. 205 Generally, as a collective
duty, Muslims are not to partake in the lesser jihad unless their heads of State
order them to do so.
To promulgate his view of jihad as an individual duty, Osama bin Laden
released the following in a fatwa 206 regarding action to be taken against U.S.
and Coalition forces: “Terrorizing you [Americans], while you are carrying
arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate
right well known to all humans and other creatures.” 207 He followed with a
second fatwa in 1998 that was cosigned by other Islamist terrorist group
leaders. That fatwa included the following:
We issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the
Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for
every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it,
in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from
their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of
Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance
with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they
fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” 208

Bin Laden’s lack of authority to call for jihad is discussed in Part III(B)
above.
In his first fatwa, bin Laden also called for young Muslims to serve as
martyrs. In relevant part he stated the following:
He (Allah’s Blessings and Salutations may be on him) also said: “the
best of the martyrs are those who do NOT turn their faces away from the
battle till they are killed. They are in the high level of (paradise). Their Lord
laughs to them (in pleasure) and when your Lord laughs to a slave of His,
He will not hold him to an account”—narrated by Ahmad with correct and
trustworthy reference. And: “a martyr will not feel the pain of death except
like how you feel when you are pinched.” Saheeh Al-Jame’ As-Sagheer. He
also said: “a martyr’s privileges are guaranteed by Allah; forgiveness with
the first gush of his blood, he will be shown his seat in paradise, he will be
205. Id.
206. A fatwa is a religious opinion on a point of Islamic law that is normally published
by an Islamic scholar.
207. Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, supra
note 196.
208. Id.
1656

Islamist Terrorism and the Classical Islamic Law of War

Vol. 97

decorated with the jewels of belief (Imaan), married off to the beautiful
ones, protected from the test in the grave, assured security in the day of
judgment, crowned with the crown of dignity, a ruby of which is better
than this whole world (Duniah) and its’ entire content, wedded to seventy
two of the pure Houries (beautiful ones of Paradise) and his intercession
on the behalf of seventy of his relatives will be accepted”—narrated by
Ahmad and At-Tirmithi (with the correct and trustworthy reference).
Those youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double
than their rewards in fighting someone else not from the people of the
book. They have no intention except to enter paradise by killing you. An
infidel, and enemy of God like you, cannot be in the same hell with his
righteous executioner. 209

The Koran and the Traditions support the practice of martyrdom on behalf of Islam, but only when jihad is authorized. 210 Islamist terrorists also
violate Islamic law when they make martyrdom their intent, rather than a
possible outcome of a just war. One key Tradition states, “a person whose
intent is glory, booty, or females has no ties to God, and only God knows
who strives for his sake.” 211
In support of its jihad against the United States, al-Qaeda’s atrocities include the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the 1998
attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the bombing of the
USS Cole, and the September 11th attacks on the United States. Many other
atrocities have been averted, yet this Islamist terrorist view continues to
spread and continues to threaten U.S. military members, U.S. allies, Muslim
governments, and civilians around the world.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As seen in the preceding sections, there is no “perfectly defined delineation”
between Islamist terrorist ideology and mainstream ideology. 212 There are
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., KORAN 4:74 (“Let those fight in the way of Allah who sell the life of this
world for the other. Whoso fighteth in the way of Allah, be he slain or be he victorious, on
him We shall bestow a vast reward.”); KORAN 9:111 (“Allah hath purchased of the believers
their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in
His cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the
Gospel, and the Qur’an: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah? then rejoice
in the bargain which ye have concluded: that is the achievement supreme.”).
211. MUHAMMAD AL-BUKHARI, 6 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI No. 430 (846).
212. See ABOUL-ENEIN & ZUHUR, supra note 17, at 31 for a similar conclusion.
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aspects of Islam that may be manipulated to support extremist views. Chief
among them is what may be read as the Koran’s authorization for aggressive
jihad to expand the faith. That view contradicts the basic precepts of Islam,
which are peace and the freedom of religion. The Koran must also be viewed
in its historical context. It was revealed in the seventh century, a time when
aggressive war was the norm and there was no substantial jus in bello. Islam
was very progressive and instituted rules for warfare that were not replicated
by the West for another six centuries. While there is no seventh century culture whose law of war can conform to modern day norms, Shari’a law likely
came closest.
The complicating aspect for Shari’a law is that the Koran, revealed almost
fourteen hundred years ago, is held to be the literal word of God, the supreme law, and so a concordance with modern law is required to facilitate its
use for modern legal issues. Al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations reject this and instead hold onto a literal view and a selective understanding of the Koran and Traditions to support their world view. The issue
then becomes developing a way to combat the influence and effect that Islamist terrorists have on the world.
In the battle of the marketplace of ideas, the best weapon is a better idea.
Islamist terrorist groups and their supporting madrasas (religious schools)
teach young Muslims in ways that “manipulate, hide, and deemphasize aspects of Islamic history, law and Koranic verse.” 213 The most effective
weapon against these groups is evidence that Islamic laws and principles
contradict their terrorist ideologies. 214 That can only be achieved by Muslim
leaders and clerics, but can be supported by western democracies.
Policy makers must educate themselves on Islamic law, the competing
political interests, and Islamist terrorists’ ideology and motivation. The
United States cannot win a war against an enemy we do not know or understand. We have to ally ourselves with Muslim leaders who want to help us in
this struggle, whether for their own self-interest, because they believe it is
the right thing to do, or both. This is not a struggle that can be won through
the use of military force or by western democracies alone. It is a battle of
ideas, beliefs, and information that requires a unified effort.

213. Id.
214. Id.
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